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ABSTRACT 
  Bankruptcy law allows third-party creditors of a consignee to 
attach consigned property in the consignee’s possession when the 
consignee declares bankruptcy unless a consignor has acted to perfect 
a security interest in the consigned goods by complying with 
commercial law requirements. The drafters of the Uniform 
Commercial Code (UCC) provided for attachment because they 
wanted to protect third-party creditors from the unwelcome surprise 
of hidden liens dominating claims to a consignee’s property in 
bankruptcy. Applying this attachment policy overly broadly in the art 
consignment context creates problems, though, because opportunistic 
creditors can use the attachment procedure despite having full 
knowledge of the widespread practice of consignment in the art 
industry. In 2001, the drafters revised the UCC with the desire to 
clarify consignment issues as part of the revision. Courts continue to 
struggle, however, with analyzing issues of consignment in 
bankruptcy. This Note argues that because art consignment stands 
apart from other types of consignment, the law should not require art 
consignor-collectors to follow UCC filing requirements to protect 
their artwork from attachment by third-party creditors, who are 
acutely aware of the risk that a consignee art dealership is 
substantially dealing in consigned artwork. Further, it suggests that 
courts should presume that art dealerships are generally known to be 
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substantially selling in consigned work. Once consignors show that an 
art dealership is generally known to be substantially selling in 
consigned work, courts should exempt consigned artwork from the 
bankruptcy estate. This Note also proposes extending the statutory 
protection afforded to consignor-artists to consignor-collectors. 
INTRODUCTION 
As security guards seized masterpieces from the famed Berry-
Hill gallery, the public got a glimpse into the “often-byzantine 
financial maneuvering”1 of the art world. Berry-Hill, a prominent 
New York gallery, had filed for bankruptcy in federal court.2 The art 
world was dismayed by news that Berry-Hill had outstanding debts as 
large as $50 million.3 As the dust settled, artists and collectors who 
had consigned work to Berry-Hill began to realize what the 
bankruptcy filing meant for their artwork. The pieces they had 
consigned to Berry-Hill to sell on their behalf might be “trapped in 
bankruptcy court purgatory” for months.4 Some observers wondered 
how savvy businesspeople, accustomed to protecting their assets, had 
been so cavalier.5 Consigning artwork was a pervasive practice in New 
York galleries, and questions lingered about why no one was 
protecting these consignors.6 
Less than two years later, a familiar scene played out when 
another premier New York gallery, Salander-O’Reilly, filed for 
bankruptcy.7 Some collectors charged Salander with selling consigned 
 
 1. Carol Vogel, Gallery Under Legal Fire Declares Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 
2005, at E1. 
 2. David Hewett, Berry-Hill Galleries: Bankruptcy’s Tentacles Spread, ME. ANTIQUE 
DIG., Feb. 2006, http://maineantiquedigest.com/articles_archive/articles/feb06/berryhill0206.htm. 
 3. Vogel, supra note 1. 
 4. See John Dizard, Paint Peels on a Genteel Market, FT.COM, June 23, 2006, http://www. 
ft.com/cms/s/2/f8dc4f00-02c4-11db-9231-0000779e2340.html (discussing the purgatory-like effect 
of Berry-Hill’s bankruptcy on the painting “Kids” by George Bellows). 
 5. Id. (“Otherwise hard-nosed customers, who in their day jobs would never ship around 
assets of their own companies without documentation, failed to file what are known as UCC 
notices (chattel mortgages in the UK) on their property. These would have secured their 
ownership of the property.”). 
 6. David Hewett, The Berry-Hill Bankruptcy: Biggest Problem Solved but Still Some 
Uncertain Waters to Navigate, ME. ANTIQUE DIG., Mar. 2006, http://maineantiquedigest.com/ 
articles_archive/articles/mar06/berryhill0306.htm. 
 7. James Barron & Patrick McGeehan, Big Dreams, Big Expenses: In a Lavish Town 
House, an Art Gallery in Trouble, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2007, at B1. 
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artwork and then failing to pay them their due proceeds.8 Collectors 
were not the only parties with bankruptcy claims against the gallery.9 
Salander was inundated by a “cascade of lawsuits” from concerned 
creditors.10 As with Berry-Hill, consigned work and consignment 
proceeds were caught up in bankruptcy proceedings.11 Among these 
claimants were artists’ heirs, an emissary from the Italian prime 
minister seeking a painting of St. John the Baptist, and the 
Indianapolis Museum, which had loaned Salander a prized 
Caravaggio.12 Presented with competing claims over assets and 
confusion about title to many of the works, a state court judge 
ordered the gallery locked and “effectively shut [it] down.”13 
The precarious position of the Berry-Hill and Salander 
consignors in bankruptcy resulted from the curious treatment of 
consigned goods in bankruptcy. After its revision in 2001, most 
consignment transactions are governed by Article 9 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code (UCC).14 Under UCC section 9-319, if the 
consignor’s security interest is unperfected, then “for purposes of 
determining the rights of creditors of . . . a consignee, while the goods 
are in the possession of the consignee, the consignee is deemed to 
have rights and title to the goods identical to those the consignor had 
or had power to transfer.”15 This effectively means that if the 
consignor does not have a perfected security interest in an artwork, 
 
 8. Philip Boroff, Bankruptcy Judge Denies Salander’s Request for Job at Gallery, 
BLOOMBERG.COM, Feb. 28, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601088&sid= 
aitx5_a6joVE&refer=muse (“Artists, heirs and collectors, including hedge fund manager Roy 
Lennox of Caxton Associates, have alleged that the dealer [Salander] sold art on consignment 
without remitting proceeds . . . .”). 
 9. Drama on East 71st Street, ARTNET NEWS, Oct. 17, 2007, http://www.artnet.com/ 
magazineus/news/artnetnews/artnetnews10-17-07.asp (“Other prominent litigants have been 
lining up since late spring. According to reports, Salander is being sued by artist and former 
New York Observer publisher Arthur Carter for nonpayment, and by former tennis star John 
McEnroe for failing to double a $162,500 investment in five months.”). 
 10. James Barron, A Gallery’s Money Crisis, and Shaken Trust, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2007, 
at B2. 
 11. Philip Boroff, Salander-O’Reilly Gallery Can Borrow $870,000, Judge Rules, 
BLOOMBERG.COM, Jan. 4, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid= 
aobQyQnXZvsc. 
 12. Anemona Hartocollis, Art Gallery Is Target as Dozens Go to Court, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
20, 2007, at B1. 
 13. James Barron, Judge Shuts Down Art Gallery as Lawsuits Multiply, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
19, 2007, at B1. 
 14. George H. Singer & Michael P. Warren, The ABCs of the New UCC: How to Consign 
Under Revised Article 9, BENCH & B. MINN., Mar. 2005, at 28, 28. 
 15. U.C.C. § 9-319 (2008). 
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third-party creditors may attach consigned artwork in a consignee’s 
bankruptcy proceedings.16 If the consignor has a perfected security 
interest, the consignor would be able to claim superpriority in the 
consignor’s interest to the artwork over all third-party creditors.17 
Therefore, determining whether the consignor’s security interest is 
perfected is critical to deciding parties’ bankruptcy rights to the 
collateral. 
Article 9 gives consignors an automatic purchase-money security 
interest in inventory,18 and courts would likely consider paintings to 
be inventory.19 If perfected, a purchase-money security interest offers 
its holder something of a golden ticket.20 Subject to a few exceptions, 
purchase-money security interest holders take priority over all other 
claimants in bankruptcy.21 To reap the benefits of superpriority, 
consignors must still perfect their purchase-money security interest to 
avoid having their work seized in a consignee’s bankruptcy.22 
Consignors most commonly perfect purchase-money security interests 
by filing a UCC-1 financing statement.23 In the art world, which at 
times seems allergic to paperwork, parties often do not fill out UCC 
 
 16. See Mark R. Owens & Gary M. Hoke, Lien on Me: Navigating the Consignment Rules 
Under UCC Article 9, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Oct. 2006, at 24, 24 (“Generally, if the consignee 
under such a consignment arrangement files for bankruptcy relief, the consigned goods are 
property of the consignee’s bankruptcy estate.”). 
 17. U.C.C. § 9-317(a). 
 18. Id. § 9-103(d). 
 19. See id. § 9-102(a)(48)(B) (defining “inventory” as goods “held by a person for sale or 
lease or to be furnished under a contract of service”). But see In re Haley & Steele, Inc., No. 
051617BLS, 2005 WL 3489869, at *3 (Mass. Dist. Ct. Nov. 14, 2005) (“[T]o the extent that those 
persons listed . . . as ‘consumer consignors’—as opposed to ‘commercial consignors’—are 
persons whose goods consisted of artwork that was used or bought for use primarily for 
personal, family, or household purposes immediately before delivery to Haley & Steele, then 
their artwork falls outside of the ‘consignment’ defined in sec. 9-102(20).”). 
 20. See U.C.C. § 9-324(a) (“[A] perfected purchase-money security interest in goods . . . 
has priority over a conflicting security interest in the same goods.”). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Ingrid Michelsen Hillinger & Michael G. Hillinger, 2001: A Code Odyssey (New Dawn 
for the Article 9 Secured Creditor), 106 COM. L.J. 105, 114 (2001). 
 23. Security interests can also be perfected by possession, U.C.C. § 9-313, and by the holder 
having what Article 9 deems as “control” over the special categories of collateral, id. § 9-314. 
Because the consignor delivers the painting to the consignee, and thus gives possession to the 
consignee, possession would likely be an impracticable method of perfection. Perfection by 
control applies only to “investment property, deposit accounts, letter-of-credit rights, or 
electronic chattel paper.” Id. § 9-314(a). A security interest in artwork does not fall into any of 
these categories. 
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forms.24 Without filing a UCC-1 financing statement, the art 
consignor’s security interest may remain unperfected.25 If the 
consignor’s security interest is unperfected and the consignee files for 
bankruptcy, the consigned property is deemed property of the 
bankruptcy estate.26 Instead of getting possession of the artwork, the 
consignor merely stands as a creditor with an unperfected security 
interest.27 
The policy rationale behind allowing third-party creditors to 
claim rights to consigned property was that the drafters of the UCC 
did not want third parties to be harmed by “hidden liens” on a 
debtor’s property.28 But the risk of third-party creditors being shocked 
by hidden liens on consigned artwork in a gallery’s inventory is less 
convincing than in other industries. Consignment is a common 
practice in the art world.29 Third-party creditors of an art gallery 
should arguably be aware that some of the gallery’s inventory consists 
of consigned work. Because consignment is a widespread practice in 
the art industry, there is less reason to think creditors would be 
susceptible to hidden liens. 
The difficulty with the UCC’s treatment of art consignment is 
that “the law treats the consignment of art to the gallery the same way 
[it] would treat the consignment of screwdrivers to a shop.”30 The 
consignment of art, however, involves issues not contemplated in the 
 
 24. See TAD CRAWFORD & SUSAN MELLON, THE ARTIST-GALLERY PARTNERSHIP: A 
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO CONSIGNING ART 29 (1998) (commenting on the UCC filing form often 
being “an unrealistic measure” because of an aversion to completing the paperwork required 
for a UCC financing statement). 
 25. See Owens & Hoke, supra note 16, at 24 (“[T]he consignor may proactively protect its 
rights in the consigned goods by perfecting its purchase-money security interest in the consigned 
goods that UCC § 9-103(d) creates. To perfect its security interest, the consignor must file an 
appropriate UCC financing statement.”). 
 26. Id.  
 27. See Gary D. Spivey, Consignment Transactions Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 
40 A.L.R.3d 1078, 1086 (1971) (“Article 9 subordinates an unperfected security interest to the 
claims of certain lien creditors . . . general creditors often will be able to defeat the unperfected 
security interest of the consignor . . . .”). 
 28. U.C.C. § 2-326 cmt. 2 (2000) (“The purpose of the exception is merely to limit the 
effect of the present subsection itself . . . to cases in which creditors of the buyer may reasonably 
be deemed to have been misled by the secret reservation.” (emphasis added)); see also Cantor v. 
Anderson, 639 F. Supp. 364, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (“The purpose of U.C.C. § 2-326 is to protect 
creditors of a consignee of goods from hidden liens.”). 
 29. CRAWFORD & MELLON, supra note 24, at 3. 
 30. A Dealer and Collector Describes His Experiences with Berry-Hill, ME. ANTIQUE DIG., 
Mar. 2006, http://maineantiquedigest.com/articles_archive/articles/mar06/f-berryhill2-0306.htm 
(quoting the Hon. Joseph P. Carroll). 
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consignment of screwdrivers. Whereas the value of a screwdriver can 
be judged according to the broader general market for screwdrivers, 
the value of a unique piece of artwork depends on an “inherently 
subjective process.”31 Also, hardware stores’ norms of accounting and 
filing are likely more geared toward UCC filing than the “handshake 
agreement” culture of the art world.32 
In light of the art market’s unique demands, this Note suggests 
developing a bankruptcy policy that responds to the distinctive 
features of art consignment. Part I describes courts’ historical 
confusion in analyzing consignment transactions in bankruptcy and 
the failure of the 2001 UCC revisions to fully remedy this confusion. 
Part II discusses how several states have responded to flaws regarding 
how the UCC handles consignment by enacting statutes to protect 
artist-consignors when dealers declare bankruptcy. Part III examines 
the lack of comparable protection for collector-consignors. Finally, 
Part IV reconsiders the treatment of collector-consignors when their 
art dealership files for bankruptcy and recommends measures to 
safeguard collectors’ rights to their artwork. Possible ways to mold a 
consignment-bankruptcy policy that responds to the unique features 
of art consignment include creating a presumption that art dealers are 
generally known to be selling consigned art. Moreover, showing that 
art dealerships are known to sell consigned art should exempt 
consigned paintings from the bankruptcy estate. Additionally, state 
statutory protections for artist-consignors should be extended to 
consignor-collectors. 
I.  THE HISTORY OF CONSIGNMENT IN BANKRUPTCY 
Consignment under bankruptcy law is something of an anomaly 
in the law, in part because consignment involves the overlapping 
sources of the laws of agency and bankruptcy. Courts have defined 
the consignment relationship broadly: A consignment sale occurs 
when a “merchant takes possession of goods and holds them for sale 
with the obligation to pay the owner for the goods from the proceeds 
 
 31. See John G. Steinkamp, Fair Market Value, Blockage, and the Valuation of Art, 71 
DENV. U. L. REV. 335, 338 (1994) (“Valuation of artworks, however, offers no such ease or 
certainty. Artworks are not fungible; each is unique. Sales of the particular work to be valued, 
or of comparable pieces, may occur infrequently. . . . [V]aluation of art is an inherently 
subjective process and experts’ opinions often vary dramatically.” (citations omitted)). 
 32. See Anthony Haden-Guest, Art Scandal: Art World Shake-Up?, FORBES.COM, Feb. 14, 
2001, http://www.forbes.com/2001/02/14/0213artfraud4.html (describing the handshake culture 
of art dealers). 
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of a sale by the merchant. If the merchant does not sell the goods the 
merchant may return the goods to the owner without obligation.” 33 
When a consignor delivers goods to the consignee, despite vesting the 
consignee with the rights to sell the goods, title remains with the 
consignor.34 
An agency relationship accompanies a consignment 
relationship.35 The consignor acts as the principal and the consignee 
serves as the agent.36 Under agency law, when the consignor appoints 
the consignee as an agent, the consignee has fiduciary duties to act 
with “the utmost good faith, loyalty, and honesty toward the 
principal.”37 Inherent in the agent’s duties of good faith and loyalty is 
an obligation to prioritize the principal’s interests over the agent’s 
own interests.38 
Whereas the agency relationship in consignment gives the 
consignor rights to the consignee’s good faith and fiduciary duties, the 
consignor receives somewhat counterintuitive treatment in 
bankruptcy. In bankruptcy law, a priority system determines which of 
the insolvent party’s creditors will receive access to portions of the 
bankruptcy estate.39 In order of descending priority are, first, secured 
creditors with perfected interests, second, secured creditors with 
unperfected security interests, and third, general unsecured 
creditors.40 When a consignee files for bankruptcy, creditors may 
 
 33. See, e.g., Bank of Cal. v. Thornton-Blue Pacific, Inc., 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 90, 94 (Ct. App. 
1997) (defining the trigger of a consignment relationship by the delivery of goods to a merchant 
with the understanding that the merchant will sell the goods on the consignor’s behalf and remit 
the proceeds, and not by formalistic contract language). 
 34. Bruce S. Nathan, Consignment the Wrong Way or How to Become Last in Line, AM. 
BANKR. INST. J., Nov. 2002, at 14, 14. 
 35. See CRAWFORD & MELLON, supra note 24, at 4 (“Each party in the consignment 
relationship makes a serious commitment to the other. Consigning artists give up a measure of 
control over their creations, entrusting them to an agent whose business is the marketing of 
artworks.”). 
 36. See id. at 61 (“When it is deemed that a consignment relationship exists between the 
artist and the gallery, the gallery is then statutorily considered the agent of the artist.”). 
 37. 3 AM. JUR. 2D Agency § 205 (2002). 
 38. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 cmt. b (2006) (“Although an agent’s 
interests are often concurrent with those of the principal, the general fiduciary principle requires 
that the agent subordinate the agent’s interests to those of the principal and place the principal’s 
interests first as to matters connected with the agency relationship.”). 
 39. 11 U.S.C. §§ 506–07 (2006); see also U.C.C. § 9-322(a)(1) (2008) (“Conflicting perfected 
security interests and agricultural liens rank according to priority in time of filing or 
perfection.”). 
 40. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 506–07 (stating the bankruptcy code’s rules regarding creditors 
secured interest claims and priorities in bankruptcy); U.C.C. § 9-322(a)(1) (stating the general 
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attach the property in the consignee’s possession.41 Under Article 9 of 
the UCC, if a consignor has not taken efforts to file the consignor’s 
interest in the consigned property, the consignor will stand as a 
creditor with an unperfected security interest in the bankruptcy 
action.42 
Some may find this result counterintuitive. In many cases, 
consignors transfer their property into a consignee’s control so the 
consignee can sell the property. The parties understand that the 
consignee will keep a percentage of the sale proceeds as a 
commission.43 In bankruptcy law, however, the consignor’s status 
often becomes that of a “general unsecured creditor.”44 This status 
does not entitle the consignor to the entirety of the proceeds from the 
sale of consigned items. Many times, the consignor in bankruptcy is 
unable to directly claim the proceeds arising from the sale of the 
consigned property. Instead, the consignor joins the pool of creditors 
with unperfected security interests.45 
This Part traces the UCC’s past methods of dealing with 
consignment in bankruptcy under section 9-114 and section 2-326, 
detailing the UCC’s requirements that consignors either file a UCC 
financing statement or prove that the consignee was “generally 
known by his creditors to be substantially engaged in selling the 
goods of others” in order to have a superior claim to the consignors’ 
consigned property.46 The UCC’s history informs an examination of 
consignor-collectors’ continuing problems, following the revision of 
the UCC in 2001, with regaining possession of their work in 
bankruptcy. 
 
rules that govern priority: perfected security interests have priority over unperfected security 
interests, and conflicting perfected security interests “rank according to priority in time of filing 
or perfection”). 
 41. See Owens & Hoke, supra note 16, at 24 (noting that when a consignee files for 
bankruptcy, “consigned goods are property of the consignee’s bankruptcy estate,” meaning 
consigned goods can become subject to creditor claims as creditors attempt to settle the 
consignee’s outstanding debts). 
 42. See id. (“The typical consignor is relegated to the status of a general unsecured 
creditor.”). 
 43. 32 AM. JUR. 2D Factors and Commission Merchants § 18 (2007). 
 44. Owens & Hoke, supra note 16, at 24. 
 45. Id. 
 46. U.C.C. § 2-326 (2000). 
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A. The UCC’s Past Method for Dealing with Consignments 
Prior to 2001, Article 9 or UCC section 2-326 regulated 
consignment agreements between collectors and dealers.47 When a 
transaction was a “consignment . . . intended as security” in the 
consigned goods, it fell under Article 9.48 For consignors to receive 
priority over third-party creditors, consignors were obliged to file and 
perfect their security interests in the consigned goods.49 To perfect 
their security interests, Article 9 required consignors to file a UCC-1 
financing statement.50 Section 9-114 also imposed a number of 
notification requirements to alert other security holders of the 
collateral that the consignor had a consignment interest in the 
property.51 
UCC section 2-326 regulated consignments determined to be 
“sale or return” transactions.52 Section 2-326(3) provided that when 
goods were transferred to a person for sale and that individual 
operated a business selling goods of that kind “under a name other 
than the name of the person making delivery, then with respect to 
claims of creditors of the person conducting the business the goods 
are deemed to be on sale or return.”53 Section 2-326(3) operated even 
when the parties used explicit terms like “on consignment” in their 
agreement.54 Under section 2-326, if an art dealer declared 
bankruptcy while consigned artwork was in the dealer’s custody, 
creditors might be able to claim rights to the work or its proceeds.55 
Therefore, section 2-326 could have punitive results for a consignor. 
Though the consignor entered into an agreement with the consignee 
that the consignee would either sell the painting and then distribute 
an agreed-upon share to the consignor or return the painting, the 
 
 47. See Mark Marcone, Note, The UCC and Consignment: Making the Code Safe for Artists 
and Other “Little Fellows,” 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 579, 597–602 (1994) (discussing the 
UCC’s treatment of consignment transactions in 1994). 
 48. Id. at 597. 
 49. Nathan, supra note 34, at 14. 
 50. U.C.C. § 9-114 (stating that “[a] person who delivers goods under a consignment which 
is not a security interest and who would be required to file under this Article by paragraph 
(3)(c) of Section 2-326” would be able to secure priority over other claiming creditors by filing a 
financing statement). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. § 2-326. 
 53. Id. § 2-326(3). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. § 2-326(2). 
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consignor’s claim against the consignee merely joined the other 
unsecured creditors in bankruptcy. 
There were three exceptions to section 2-326(3)’s reach in “sale 
or return” transactions. The two significant exceptions with respect to 
art consignments are subpart (b), which exempted consignors who 
“establishe[d] that the person conducting the business is generally 
known by his creditors to be substantially engaged in selling the 
goods of others,”56 and subpart (c), which excluded transactions that 
followed the security filing requirements of Article 9.57 Though the 
“generally known by his creditors to be substantially engaged in 
selling the goods” exemption might seem like a panacea for a 
consignor who consigned to a dealership that sold a considerable 
amount of artwork belonging to others, winning the exemption was 
not problem free.58 
The UCC comments helped shed light on the drafters’ 
interpretation of the “generally known” exception, stating that the 
exception applied to debtors “primarily” engaged in selling the goods 
of others.59 First, under section 2-326(3), the consignor bore the 
burden of proving that a dealership was “generally known by his 
creditors to be substantially engaged in selling the goods of others.”60 
Second, courts have required consignors to prove that “most” of the 
debtor’s creditors were aware that the creditor was substantially 
selling the goods of others.61 Courts have not been sympathetic to 
mere evidence that a debtor was significantly selling consigned goods, 
which might lead to an inference that a consignor was generally 
known.62 
 
 56. Id. § 2-326(3)(b). 
 57. Id. § 2-326(3)(c). The third exception, found in subpart (a), exempted consignors who 
“complie[d] with an applicable law providing for a consignor’s interest or the like to be 
evidenced by a sign.” Id. § 2-326(3)(a). 
 58. See CRAWFORD & MELLON, supra note 24, at 58 (noting that proving the generally 
known exception may be “difficult and costly to prove”). 
 59. U.C.C. § 2-326 cmt. 2 (emphasis added); see also id. (“A necessary exception is made 
where the buyer is known to be engaged primarily in selling the goods of others . . . .”). 
 60. In re BRI Corp., 88 B.R. 71, 74–75 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (“The burden of proving 
compliance with one of the exceptions outlined in Section 2326(c) of the U.C.C. is on the 
consignor.”). 
 61. See, e.g., id. at 75 (maintaining vigorously the standard that the consignor must prove 
the knowledge of “most” of the debtor’s creditors, and rejecting as insufficient evidence that 
approximately 40 percent of creditors, or what the court characterized as “some” of the 
creditors, knew that the consignee was substantially selling consigned goods). 
 62. See Quaker City Iron Works, Inc. v. Ganz (In re Wicaco Mach. Corp.), 49 B.R. 340, 344 
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984) (holding that though one-fifth of creditors had “actual knowledge” of 
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Courts’ application of the generally known exception has been 
uneven.63 In In re Alper-Richman Furs,64 a court denied summary 
judgment on whether a consignee was generally known when 79 
percent of the unsecured claims against the consignee were by an 
affiliated company with strong ties to the consignee and well 
acquainted with the consignee’s consignment practices.65 In General 
Electric Credit Corp. v. Strickland Division of Rebel Lumber Co.,66 the 
debtor had a flashing sign outside of his business announcing that he 
sold the goods of others. He also publicized that he sold goods of 
others in radio advertisements.67 The court found that the debtor was 
generally known by creditors to sell the goods of others, and, having 
proven the generally known exception, the consignor won his claim to 
 
the debtor’s consignment practices, which amounted to 63 percent of the claims against the 
debtor, other creditors were not sufficiently aware of the debtor’s consignment because 
“[s]ection 2326(c)(2) . . . does not refer to the amount of the indebtedness, but to the 
creditors”); see also Steege v. Affiliated Bank/N. Shore Nat’l (In re Alper-Richman Furs, Ltd.), 
147 B.R. 140, 150–51 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992) (seeking evidence of what other outside creditors 
knew about the debtor’s consignment practices, despite the fact that claims of the affiliated 
debtor’s company and employees of that company comprised 79 percent of unsecured claims 
against the debtor). 
 63. See In re Griffin, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (CBC) 492 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1960) (holding that 
a furniture company’s sign gave sufficient notice that the company sold the goods of others 
when the sign stated that the company sold used furniture and its mention of “cleaning and 
moth proofing of furniture and rugs obviously could only refer to personal property of others 
than the owner of the business”); Gen. Elec. Credit Corp. v. Strickland Div. of Rebel Lumber 
Co., 437 So. 2d 1240, 1245 (Ala. 1983) (upholding the lower court’s determination that a debtor 
was generally known to be selling consigned goods when the debtor promoted selling goods for 
others on the radio, had a flashing sign that declared that he sold goods for others, and a 
complaining creditor knew that the debtor sold goods for others). But see In re Valley Media, 
Inc., 279 B.R. 105, 132 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002) (holding that even if creditors knew about 
consignment, Valley Media’s 17 percent consignment level did not rise to a substantial enough 
level to meet the generally known exception); In re Alper-Richman Furs, Ltd., 147 B.R. at 149–
50 (denying summary judgment when claims of the affiliated debtor’s company and employees 
of that company held 79 percent of the total unsecured claims and seemingly had knowledge of 
debtor’s practice of consignment, instead requiring additional evidence about what other 
outside creditors knew about the debtor’s consignment practices); Multibank Nat’l of W. Mass., 
N.A. v. State St. Auto Sales, Inc. (In re State St. Auto Sales, Inc.), 81 B.R. 215, 218 (Bankr. D. 
Mass. 1988) (holding that even though the largest creditor knew of the debtor’s consignment of 
cars, including the cars at issue in the case, this did not satisfy the generally known exception 
because the debtor consigned only a few cars each year and most creditors were not aware of 
the debtor’s consignment business). 
 64. Steege v. Affiliated Bank/N. Shore Nat’l (In re Alper-Richman Furs, Ltd.), 147 B.R. 
140 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992). 
 65. Id. at 149–50. 
 66. Gen. Elec. Credit Corp. v. Strickland Div. of Rebel Lumber Co., 437 So. 2d 1240 (Ala. 
1983). 
 67. Id. at 1245. 
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the property.68 In addition, even in the absence of a showing that the 
consignee’s business met the generally known exception, some courts 
have denied a third-party creditor’s claim to consigned property if the 
opposing party can show that the creditor had actual knowledge of 
the consignment situation.69 
The art market adds a unique wrinkle to determining the 
applicability of the generally known exception to art dealerships.70 
Many art dealerships feature a number of different works of art from 
multiple sources. Dealerships sometimes showcase work that is on 
loan to the dealership, work that the dealership itself owns and is up 
for sale, and work that the dealership is selling on consignment.71 
Though consignors could make a strong argument that a particular 
dealership is generally known by its creditors to be selling goods of 
others, a creditor may argue that because the dealership showcases 
items that are not consignment items, its consignment sales are not 
substantial enough to prove that the dealer is generally known to sell 
consignment items.72 
B. The 2001 UCC Revision 
The UCC was revised in 2001 with the hope that the changes 
would clarify a number of issues, including consignment.73 Revisions 
 
 68. Id. 
 69. See GBS Meat Indus. Pty. Ltd. v. Kress-Dobkin Co., 474 F. Supp. 1357, 1363 (W.D. Pa. 
1979) (“The clear import of the comments to § 2-326, and the judicial precedents discussed 
above establish that, where a secured creditor knows that the proceeds rightfully belong to a 
consignor, the consignor must have priority.”); Belmont Int’l, Inc. v. Am. Int’l Shoe Co., 831 
P.2d 15, 19 (Or. 1992) (en banc) (“In a dispute between a consignor and a creditor of the 
consignee as to priority in the consigned goods, proof that the creditor actually knew of the 
consignment before becoming a creditor is sufficient to meet the requirements of ORS 
72.3260(3)(b) [Oregon’s statute adopting UCC section 2-326].”). 
 70. See CRAWFORD & MELLON, supra note 24, at 58 (noting that, for artists, requirement 
that “the gallery’s dealings were known to the creditor . . . . may be difficult and costly to 
prove”). 
 71. See, e.g., Hoovers.com, Industry Profile: Art Dealers and Galleries, http://premium. 
hoovers.com/subscribe/ind/fr/profile/basic.xhtml?ID=356 (last visited Jan. 1, 2009) (“Some 
exhibitions incorporate loaned art to provide additional works by the same artist or related 
works from the period.”); see also CRAWFORD & MELLON, supra note 24, at 5 (noting that 
galleries have varied practices in the relative proportion of artwork that is consigned and the 
proportion the gallery itself owns). 
 72. See U.C.C. § 2-326(3)(b) (2000) (stating the requirement that a consignor prove that 
the consignee was “generally known by his creditors to be substantially engaged in selling the 
goods of others”). 
 73. See, e.g., Robbins v. Comerica Bank-Detroit (In re Zwagerman), 115 B.R. 540, 548 n.4 
(Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1990) (“A court recently remarked, ‘[t]he Uniform Commercial Code’s 
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to the code recategorized the majority of consignments under the 
umbrella of Article 9.74 Revisions also diminished the application of 
Article 2 in consignment transactions by removing all references to 
“consignment” from the language of section 2-326.75 These revisions 
thus gave Article 9 a much more expansive reach over all types of 
consignment transactions.76 Consignment interests became more 
connected to security interests with the amendment of the definition 
of “security interest” to encompass “any interest of a consignor.”77 
Additionally, an amendment to the UCC extended the provision 
setting out the “general scope of the article” to explicitly include 
consignment transactions.78 
Article 9 lists the requirements for qualification as a 
consignment. For instance, the aggregate value of the goods must 
exceed $1,000 and, of particular concern to art consignment, the 
merchant must not be “generally known by its creditors to be 
substantially engaged in selling the goods of others” and the goods 
must not be “consumer goods immediately before delivery.”79 Based 
on this definition, consignments to a merchant who was not generally 
known to be substantially consigning goods would fall outside of 
Article 9. Additionally, the status of the goods immediately prior to 
consignment might complicate the application of Article 9. Under 
Article 9, “consumer goods” are defined as goods “used or bought 
primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.”80 Categorizing 
artwork under Article 9 may be uniquely difficult because a piece of 
artwork may be analogized to a piece of home décor or to a stock,81 
 
provisions regarding consignments are not models of draftmanship’. . . . When courts are forced 
to apply a confusing state law scheme to determine federal bankruptcy rights, confusion 
inevitably occurs.” (alteration in original) (quoting Ingrid Michelsen Hillinger, The Treatment of 
Consignments in Bankruptcy: Two Codes and Their Fictions, at Play, in the Fields, 6 BANKR. 
DEV. J. 73, 119 (1989))). 
 74. Singer & Warren, supra note 14, at 28. 
 75. Id. at 29. 
 76. Id. 
 77. U.C.C. § 1-201(35) (2008) (emphasis added). 
 78. U.C.C. § 9-109(a)(4). 
 79. Id. § 9-102(a)(20). 
 80. Id. § 9-102(a)(23). 
 81. See Daniel Gross, Painting for Profit: Is Art a Good Investment?, SLATE, June 21, 2006, 
http://www.slate.com/id/2144185/ (providing as one example of the similarity of art to shares in a 
company, New York University Professors Michael Moses and Jiangping Mei’s creation of a 
Dow Jones–like indicator of fine art performance in their Mei Moses index). Gross noted that 
“over the last 50 years, stocks (as represented by the S&P 500) returned 10.9 percent annually, 
while the art index returned 10.5 percent per annum.” Id. 
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and could just as easily be characterized as a good bought primarily 
for personal use, as a good bought primarily as investment property. 
If a court deemed that the artwork was bought primarily for personal 
use immediately before its delivery to a gallery, Article 9 would also 
not apply. 
If a court deems a consignment to be within the ambit of Article 
9, the amended UCC grants a consignor a chance to obtain 
superpriority if the consignor properly complies with UCC filing 
requirements.82 UCC section 9-103(d) states that “the security interest 
of a consignor in goods that are the subject of a consignment is a 
purchase-money security interest in inventory.”83 The drafters broke 
from previous versions of the UCC, which had a specific provision 
regarding the priority of consignors.84 The amended version gives 
consignors the same treatment under Article 9 as it does purchase-
money security holders of inventory.85 The boon of this grant of a 
purchase-money security interest is that, if perfected, the purchase-
money security holder generally has priority over all other conflicting 
security holders.86 The caveat that accompanies the grant is that the 
consignor must still perfect the purchase money-security interest. 
Filing a UCC-1 financing statement is the most practical way for an 
artwork consignor to perfect a security interest.  
To obtain unchallenged superpriority, the UCC requires 
consignors to follow notification procedures that give other security 
holders notice of their interest in the consigned goods.87 Purchase-
money security holders must perfect their purchase-money security 
interest when the debtor gains possession of the inventory.88 In 
addition, Article 9 requires the purchase-money security holder to 
ensure that the “holder of [a] conflicting security interest receives the 
notification within five years before the debtor receives possession of 
 
 82. U.C.C. § 9-103(d). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. § 9-103 cmt. 6 (“Under former Section 9-114, the priority of the consignor’s interest 
is similar to that of a purchase-money security interest. . . . This drafting convention obviates 
any need to set forth special priority rules applicable to the interest of a consignor.”). 
 85. Id. (“Rather, the priority of the consignor’s interest . . . can be determined by reference 
to the priority rules generally applicable to inventory, such as Sections 9-317, 9-320, 9-322, and 
9-324.”). 
 86. Id. § 9-324. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. § 9-324(b)(1). 
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the inventory” if the conflicting security holder had filed on the 
holder’s security interest.89 
The drafters also amended section 2-326 in 2001.90 In the 
amendments, the drafters deleted the consignor-friendly generally 
known exception from section 2-326(3),91 but retained the section’s 
division of sales into two categories—“sale on approval” and “sale or 
return” transactions.92 Section 2-326 makes the distinction between 
whether goods are “sale on approval” or “sale or return” critical, 
because if goods are deemed the former they are not claimable by 
creditors until accepted by the buyer, but if goods are deemed the 
latter they are claimable by creditors “while in the buyer’s 
possession.”93 
Article 9 of the revised UCC includes a generally known 
provision similar to the much-debated generally known exception of 
former UCC section 2-326(3).94 The former section 9-114 did not have 
a generally known exception, so the former section 2-326(3) provides 
the best point of comparison. Although the two exceptions operate 
similarly, the exception in former section 2-326(3) gave consignors 
rights to their artwork, whereas after consignors win the revised 
Article 9 generally known exception, they must continue to fight for 
their artwork. Under the former section 2-326(3), the generally 
known exception allowed consignors to effectively snuff out the 
claims of competing third-party creditors to consigned goods.95 Under 
the Revised Article 9, if the consignor succeeds in showing that the 
consignee was “generally known to be substantially selling” the 
consignor proves that the transaction does not fall under Article 9.96 
Proving this exception under the Revised Article 9 does not give 
 
 89. Id. § 9-324(b)(3). 
 90. Singer & Warren, supra note 14, at 28–29. 
 91. See discussion supra Part I.A. 
 92. Singer & Warren, supra note 14, at 28. 
 93. U.C.C. § 2-326. 
 94. Id. § 9-102(20). 
 95. U.C.C. § 2-326(3) (2000). 
 96. William F. Savino & David S. Widenor, Commercial Law, 55 SYRACUSE L. REV. 761, 
843–44 (2005) (“[A] consignor’s showing that its consignee is so ‘generally known’ actually 
dictates under revised section 9-102(a)(20) that the consignee/merchant is not a party to a 
consignment (as statutorily defined).”). But see In re Valley Media, Inc., 279 B.R. 105, 124 
(Bankr. D. Del. 2002) (declaring the Revised Article 9 generally known exception functionally 
equivalent to the prerevision section 2-326(3), saying, “[w]hile the purpose of this test is 
different under former U.C.C. § 2-326(3) and revised U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(20), the effect of 
proving this proposition is the same under either provision”). 
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consignors a right to retrieve their artwork from the bankruptcy 
estate; instead, courts further analyze whether the transaction falls 
under section 2-326(3), and if it does not, courts apply common law 
principles of bailment.97 
The generally known exception continues to be particularly 
salient with respect to art dealerships. As discussed in Section A, 
consignors might argue that art dealerships, which in the nature of 
their business buy and sell goods on consignment, are “generally 
known by . . . creditors to be substantially engaged in selling the 
goods of others.”98 
In In re Morgansen’s Ltd.,99 the court rejected the generally 
known exception as applied to a jewelry, furniture, and collectibles 
shop that acquired 70 percent of its goods through consignment.100 
The court also downplayed the fact that a sign outside the business 
advertised that it also had auctioneer services.101 The opinion 
highlighted that the consigned and nonconsigned goods had been 
“commingled,” and that the majority of customers browsing in the 
store would not be able to tell which of the goods for sale were 
consigned and which were owned by the store itself.102 General 
creditors would likely argue that Morgansen’s business is analogous 
to the business of art dealerships, in which some goods are consigned, 
some are owned by the dealership, and others are on loan from 
museums and private parties. Because consigned art is “commingled” 
with art the gallery owns, they would argue, the generally known 
exception should not apply. Art-law experts have noted that artist-
consignors have had trouble proving the “general knowledge” of 
creditors in court.103 
 
 97. See, e.g., In re Morgansen’s Ltd., 302 B.R. 784, 787 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2003) (“The 
standard approach is first to go to section 9-102(a)(20), and if the transaction does not fit under 
this section, then to go next to section 2-326; if the transaction does not fit under section 2-236 
[sic], then the transaction falls entirely outside the Uniform Commercial Code, and the Court 
must then fall back on the common law of bailments and other traditional practices.”). 
 98. U.C.C. § 9-102(20) (2008). 
 99. In re Morgansen’s Ltd., 302 B.R. 784 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 100. Id. at 785–88. 
 101. Id. at 788. 
 102. Id. 
 103. CRAWFORD & MELLON, supra note 24, at 58 (“[General knowledge] may be difficult 
and costly to prove. It leaves open to question whether there is a significant difference between 
‘partially engaged’ and ‘substantially engaged,’ and this distinction could yield two very 
different outcomes in terms of the artist’s works.”). These same issues would likely plague a 
collector-consignor’s “general knowledge” claim. 
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Despite attempts by the UCC drafters to simplify the analysis of 
the consignment of goods, confusion still persists. Courts often begin 
their analysis of consignment transactions by examining whether the 
transaction fits within Article 9.104 Section 2-326’s application is not 
completely dead, however.105 In analyzing consignment transactions 
after the 2001 revisions, many courts have followed an analytical map 
that draws on section 2-326.106 First, courts look to see if the 
transaction fits within Article 9.107 If the transaction fails one of the 
elements of section 9-102(a)(20), courts then see if section 2-326’s 
“sale on approval” or “sale or return” provisions are applicable.108 
Finally, if both Article 9 and section 2-326 do not apply, courts revert 
to the common law of bailments to try to resolve the issue.109 
Providing an example of a possible course of relief from the 
exhausting battles for consignors under the UCC, states have 
responded with legislation offering unique protection for artist-
consignors that insulates their work from being attached in a 
consignee’s bankruptcy. 
II.  STATE LAW HAS RESPONDED TO PROTECT ARTIST-CONSIGNORS 
State law has responded to protect artist-consignors.110 Thirty-one 
states have passed consignment statutes that specifically carve out 
 
 104. See In re Morgansen’s, Ltd., 302 B.R. at 787 (“The standard approach is first to go to 
section 9-102(a)(20) . . . .”). 
 105. There are arguments, however, that since 2001, section 2-326’s application to non–
”present sale” consignments should be dead. See In re Haley & Steele, Inc., No. 051617BLS, 
2005 WL 3489869, at *4 (Mass. Dist. Ct. Nov. 14, 2005) (“[I]t is unlikely that the drafters wished 
to leave the consumer consignor worse off than a commercial consignor, yet that would be the 
outcome if consumer consignment (now excluded from Article 9) are governed by 2-326.” 
(quoting 4 JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 38 cmt. 4 
(5th ed. 2000))). 
 106. See, e.g., In re Morgansen’s, Ltd., 302 B.R. at 787 (“The standard approach is first to go 
to section 9-102(a)(20), and if the transaction does not fit under this section, then to go next to 
section 2-326; if the transaction does not fit under section 2-236 [sic], then the transaction falls 
entirely outside the Uniform Commercial Code, and the Court must then fall back on the 
common law of bailments and other traditional practices.”). 
 107. See id. (noting that the typical first step of the consignment law analysis is to look to 
section 9-102(a)). 
 108. See id. (stating that after looking to section 9-102 and determining that the “transaction 
does not fit,” courts turn to section 2-326). 
 109. Id. 
 110. See, e.g., N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 12.01 (McKinney Supp. 2008) (providing 
protections for and delineation within the artist-consignor relationship). 
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rights for artists.111 Many of these statutes aim to offer artists “safe 
harbor” from the claims of creditors.112 These statutes are not perfect, 
however. One potential weakness of some of these state statutes is 
their failure to unequivocally establish their preemption of the 
UCC.113 UCC section 1-104 states that no section “shall be deemed to 
be impliedly repealed by subsequent legislation.”114 Many experts fear 
that despite the enactment of art consignment statutes, the absence of 
express language repealing UCC section 2-326 and Article 9 might 
leave the UCC, not the state statute, controlling.115 The artist 
consignment statutes in New York and California, two states 
traditionally known for their devotion to the arts, offer examples of 
language and mechanisms used to protect artists’ rights to their 
consigned artwork in bankruptcy that might similarly be used to 
protect collector-consignors and their artwork.116 
 
 111. ALASKA STAT. § 45.65.200 (2008); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1772 (2003); ARK. 
CODE ANN. § 4-73-207 (2001); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1738.6 (West 2008); COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-15-
102 (2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-116l (West 2007); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 686.503 (West 
2003); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-1-520 to -529 (2000); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 28-11-102 (2001); 815 
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 320/2-2 (West 2008); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 556D.2–.5 (West 2001); KY. 
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 365.855–.860 (West 2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:2151 (2003); MD. 
CODE ANN., COM. LAW §§ 11-8A-01 to -04 (LexisNexis 2005); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 104a, §§ 
1–6 (LexisNexis 1995); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 442.311–.315 (West 2002); MINN. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 324.01–.10 (West 2004); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 407.900–.910 (West 2002); MONT. CODE 
ANN. §§ 22-2-501 to -503 (2008); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 352:3–:12 (1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 
12A:2-329 to -336 (West 2004); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 56-11-1 to -3 (2008); N.Y. ARTS & CULT. 
AFF. LAW § 12.01; N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 25C-1 to -4, 25C-12 (West 2003); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. §§ 1339.71–.78 (West 2004); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 359.200–.255 (2007); 73 PA. CONS. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 2121–30 (West 2008); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-25-1001 to -1006 (2001); TEX. OCC. 
CODE ANN. §§ 2101.001–.003 (Vernon 2004); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 18.110.010–.030, 18.110.900 
(2005); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 129.01–.08 (West 2001). 
 112. RALPH E. LERNER & JUDITH BRESLER, ART LAW: THE GUIDE FOR COLLECTORS, 
INVESTORS, DEALERS, AND ARTISTS 41 (Practicing Law Inst. ed., 3d ed. 1998). 
 113. CRAWFORD & MELLON, supra note 24, at 65. 
 114. U.C.C. § 1-104 (2008). 
 115. See CRAWFORD & MELLON, supra note 24, at 65 (noting that the absence of specific 
repeals of the UCC may fail UCC preemption, “seriously calling into question the application of 
the statute”); see also Marcone, supra note 47, at 591–92 (“The case law supports the 
proposition that the Code will trump subsequent legislation unless that subsequent legislation 
expressly repeals the Code, if not the specific Code sections. If the legislation does not contain 
such a repealer, the courts will attempt to harmonize the subsequent legislation with the UCC; 
and should the conflict between the two be irreconcilable, courts will find that the Code 
governs.” (footnote omitted)). 
 116. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1738.6 (West 2008); N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 12.01. 
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A.  State Consignment Statutes: New York and California 
New York was at the forefront in passing legislation to protect 
artists in consignment transactions. According to McKinney’s Arts 
and Cultural Affairs Law section 12.01, whenever an artist delivers 
artwork to a merchant for the purpose of sale on commission, a 
consignor-consignee relationship forms.117 When this occurs, the New 
York statute places obligations on the art merchant: “(i) such 
consignee shall thereafter be deemed to be the agent of such 
consignor with respect to the said work” and “(ii) such work is trust 
property in the hands of the consignee for the benefit of the 
consignor.”118 The property continues to be trust property 
“notwithstanding its purchase by the consignee for his own account 
until the price is paid in full to the consignor,” and, if the artwork is 
sold to a third-party, 
the resale proceeds are trust funds in the hands of the 
consignee for the benefit of the consignor to the extent 
necessary to pay any balance still due to the consignor and 
such trusteeship shall continue until the fiduciary obligation of 
the consignee with respect to such transaction is discharged in 
full.119 
Most importantly for artist-consignors facing the bankruptcy of their 
art dealer, the New York statute establishes the unqualified 
superiority of the artist’s trust property, saying, “no such trust 
property or trust funds shall be subject or subordinate to any claims, 
liens or security interest of any kind or nature whatsoever.”120 
The statute’s creation of a trust, with express language that the 
trust property and proceeds should not be subordinate to any other 
claims, provides a clear statement of the artist’s priority in 
bankruptcy.121 Consignors not protected by the Arts and Cultural 
Affairs Law would likely have to battle other creditors for priority. 
Unprotected consignors would have to point to evidence that they 
 
 117. N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 12.01(a). The statute also extends to transactions 
“[w]henever an artist or craftsperson, his heirs or personal representatives” deliver the artwork 
to an art merchant. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. See id. (noting the prohibition on subordinating the trust property). 
JAY IN FINAL FINAL.DOC 5/5/2009  4:34:58 PM 
1878 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:1859 
complied with Article 9 filing and notice requirements.122 In the event 
that the creditor could establish that Article 9 did not apply, the 
consignor might also be forced to confront section 2-326.123 
California also has been progressive in advancing artist rights. As 
in New York, California has declared the existence of a consignor-
consignee relationship whenever an artist delivers artwork to an art 
merchant for sale and the artist does not receive complete payment at 
delivery.124 The statute notes that: “(a) The art dealer, after delivery 
of the work of fine art, shall constitute an agent of the artist for the 
purpose of sale or exhibition of the consigned work of fine art within 
the State of California;” and “(b) The work of fine art shall constitute 
property held in trust by the consignee for the benefit of the 
consignor, and shall not be subject to claim by a creditor of the 
consignee.”125 Like New York’s statute, California’s statute also 
provides that “proceeds from the sale of the work of fine art shall 
constitute funds held in trust by the consignee for the benefit of the 
consignor.”126 
California Civil Code section 1738.6 further notes that the trust 
“shall not be subject to claim by a creditor of the consignee.”127 This 
language disallowing claims to the trust artwork by creditors of the 
consignee presumptively prevents the bankruptcy trustee from seizing 
the artwork or its proceeds as property of the bankruptcy estate.128 In 
addition to its artist consignment statute, California has also enacted 
legislation that gives artists a percentage of sale proceeds whenever 
artwork is resold in California and the seller is a California resident.129 
 
 122. See U.C.C. § 9-310 (2008) (requiring the filing of a financing statement for perfection of 
a security interest and listing relevant exceptions, which do not include a purchase-money 
security interest in inventory as an exception). 
 123. See In re Morgansen’s Ltd., 302 B.R. 784, 788 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2003) (“The analysis 
then proceeds to section 2-326 . . . .”). 
 124. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1738.5 (West 2008). 
 125. Id. § 1738.6(a)–(b). 
 126. Id. § 1738.6(d). 
 127. Id. § 1738.6. 
 128. See CRAWFORD & MELLON, supra note 24, at 62 (“It is [the trust-creation] provision 
which protects the artist’s works from the claims of the gallery’s creditors if the gallery goes 
bankrupt. Under the UCC, which governs in the absence of this type of statute, the works would 
not be adequately protected from these claims unless the artist had filed appropriately under 
Article 9.”). 
 129. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 986(a) (“Whenever a work of fine art is sold and the seller 
resides in California or the sale takes place in California, the seller or the seller’s agent shall pay 
to the artist of such work of fine art or to such artist’s agent 5 percent of the amount of such 
sale.”). 
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The status of the artist’s percentage of sale proceeds in bankruptcy is 
another unsettled issue. The language and trust devices used to 
protect artist-consignors provide models of how such protective 
devices might be extended to collector-consignors. If state statutes 
could create trusts for collector-consignors as they do for artist-
consignors, collector-consignors could rely on the statute to retain 
their consigned artwork and circumvent conflicting creditors’ claims 
and bankruptcy proceedings. 
III.  THE LACK OF PROTECTION FOR COLLECTOR-CONSIGNORS 
Though the state statutes protecting artists in consignment 
transactions may be imperfect, they offer far better protection than 
that afforded to collector-consignors. Collector-consignors cannot 
point to a state statute that grants them superior priority to artwork 
or its proceeds. Art consignment statutes are typically limited to 
artists, their representatives, or their heirs.130 As in the Salander and 
Berry-Hill proceedings, collectors are often left in the lurch. 
Case law has not yet fully fleshed out how a collector’s claim 
would proceed in bankruptcy. Reasoning by analogy, combined with 
the few decisions and memoranda available, however, provides 
insight into how courts are likely to rule.131 In this Part, by analyzing 
the status of a hypothetical collector-consignor Susan and her rights 
in bankruptcy, the problems of the status of collector-consignors in 
bankruptcy emerge. 
Consider collector Susan who owns a Picasso but wants to take 
her collection in a new direction. She seeks out a reputable art 
dealership to help her obtain the best value when she sells the 
Picasso. Susan is unfamiliar with the financing structure of the 
 
 130. See, e.g., N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 12.01 (identifying the parties entitled to 
rights under the statute as “artist[s] or craftspe[ople], [their] heirs or personal 
representative[s]”). 
 131. See Cantor v. Anderson, 639 F. Supp. 364, 368–69 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (denying a creditor-
consignor’s claim to a Renoir that another consignor had consigned to a dealer and rejecting the 
creditor-consignor’s attempt to rely on section 2-326); see also Carroll v. Rafael Galleries, Inc. 
(In re Altman), 254 B.R. 509, 516 (D. Conn. 2000) (vacating the bankruptcy court’s 
determination that “fraudulently conveyed/invalidly consigned” paintings were part of a 
bankruptcy estate because the owner claiming interest in the paintings did not have “actual 
notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard” when the paintings were deemed part of the 
bankruptcy estate); In re Haley & Steele, Inc., No. 051617BLS, 2005 WL 3489869, at *4 (Mass. 
Dist. Ct. Nov. 14, 2005) (analyzing consigned paintings according to Article 9, section 2-326, and 
bailment law and categorizing one class of consignors as “consumer consignors,” which placed 
their consigned goods outside of the scope of Article 9). 
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dealership, but the dealership has third-party creditors who have 
loaned it money to acquire paintings for sale at the dealership. She 
decides to enter into a consignment relationship with this dealership. 
She insists that she and the dealership detail their expectations about 
their consignment relationship in a contract. She delivers the painting 
to the art dealership and the dealership hangs the painting in its 
gallery. Unbeknownst to Susan, the gallery has financed its 
operations through loans from creditors who have filed UCC 
financing statements covering their security interest in the gallery’s 
inventory. Once she delivers the painting to the gallery, she considers 
her work done and waits for the dealership to successfully sell her 
painting. Three months later, in the midst of serious financial trouble, 
the dealership files for bankruptcy. The trustee in bankruptcy seizes 
Susan’s painting. Susan wants to retrieve her Picasso immediately and 
find another dealer to sell it. 
In analyzing Susan’s claim to the Picasso, courts would first look 
at whether the consignment of the Picasso falls under the definition of 
consignment set forth in section 9-102(a)(20).132 Article 9’s application 
to Susan’s consignment may be challenged on the grounds that the 
dealership to which she consigned the painting was “generally known 
by its creditors” to be substantially engaged in consigning artwork 
and the Picasso was “consumer goods immediately before delivery.”133 
Under the definition of consignment in Article 9, if a consignee 
was generally known to be substantially engaged in consigning, a 
consignment to this consignee would fall outside of Article 9.134 In 
proving whether a consignment transaction meets the definition of 
section 9-102(a)(20), courts have placed the burden of proof on the 
party seeking the protection of the section.135 Some case law analyzing 
the generally known exception under former section 2-326 supports a 
claim that the dealership was in fact generally known to be 
substantially engaged in the business of consigning art.136 Contrary 
 
 132. See In re Morgansen’s Ltd., 302 B.R. 784, 787 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2003) (“[T]he standard 
approach is first to go to section 9-102(a)(20) . . . .”). 
 133. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(20) (2008). 
 134. Id. 
 135. In re Morgansen’s, 302 B.R. at 787. 
 136. See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Credit Corp. v. Strickland Div. of Rebel Lumber Co., 437 So. 2d 
1240, 1245 (Ala. 1983) (upholding the trial court’s decision that a consignor had met the 
“generally known” exception when the consignee advertised via the radio and a flashing sign 
that the consignee “sold goods for others”). 
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case law, however, makes this claim difficult.137 Recall the In re 
Morgansen’s case, in which the court rejected the generally known 
claim of the consignor when consigned goods were commingled with 
nonconsigned goods.138 Third-party creditors could counter Susan by 
arguing that because of the mixed nature of the art in the gallery, it 
was unclear which pieces were owned, which were on loan, and which 
were on consignment. 
A court might deem the Picasso “consumer goods” immediately 
prior to its delivery to the dealership,139 thereby excluding the painting 
from Article 9’s definition of consignment goods. Article 9 defines 
“consumer goods” as “goods used or bought for use primarily for 
personal, family, or household purposes.”140 There would likely be a 
battle over whether the artwork was primarily for Susan’s personal 
aesthetic fulfillment while also serving as a financial investment, or on 
the other hand, was primarily a financial investment for Susan’s 
portfolio but with ancillary aesthetic benefits. If the Picasso was 
deemed purchased by Susan primarily for her personal purposes, the 
painting would constitute consumer goods, and the consignment 
would fall outside of Article 9. Proving that the painting was 
“consumer goods” might aid Susan’s claim to the painting because the 
comments to section 9-102(a) note that the section excluded goods 
valued at less than $1,000 and “consumer goods” from the ambit of 
Article 9 because in these cases “filing would be inappropriate or of 
insufficient benefit to justify the costs.”141 Instead of Article 9, 
applicable bailment law regulates these transactions,142 and Susan 
would have strong arguments as a bailor that she is entitled to the 
Picasso. 
 
 137. See, e.g., In re Morgansen’s, 302 B.R. at 788 (rejecting consignor’s claims that a 
consignee was “generally known” when the consignee sold its own goods “commingled” with 
goods it was selling on consignment); see also In re Wedlo Holdings, 248 B.R. 336, 342 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ill. 2000) (holding that a business that acquired 15 to 20 percent of its inventory via 
consignment was not “substantially engaged in selling the goods of others” and thus the 2-326 
exception did not apply). 
 138. In re Morgansen’s, 302 B.R. at 788. 
 139. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(20)(C); see also In re Haley & Steele, Inc., No. 051617BLS, 2005 WL 
3489869, at *3 (Mass. Super. Ct. Nov. 14, 2005) (“This Court concludes, and rules . . . persons 
whose goods consisted of artwork that was used or bought for use primarily for personal, family, 
or household purposes immediately before delivery to Haley & Steele, then their artwork falls 
outside of the ‘consignment’ defined in sec. 9-102(20).”). 
 140. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(23). 
 141. Id. § 9-102(a)(20) cmt. 14. 
 142. Singer & Warren, supra note 14, at 30. 
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If the consignment of the Picasso survived these definitional 
challenges and the court deemed the consignment transaction to meet 
section 9-102(a)(20)’s definition of consignment, Susan would have a 
purchase-money security interest in the Picasso painting pursuant to 
UCC section 9-103(d).143 If consignors take steps to perfect this 
security interest, they have superpriority over all other claimants. If 
consignors fail to take steps to perfect their security interest, they 
stand as unsecured creditors.144 Susan has not perfected her purchase-
money security. Because she has not filed a UCC-1 financing 
statement, she would fail the Article 9 filing requirements, and thus 
her claim remains an unperfected security interest in the painting. 
Susan stands as a creditor with an unperfected interest. All perfected 
secured creditors have priority over Susan. 
Additionally, Susan has not complied with the notification 
requirements for holders of purchase-money security interests in 
inventory. Under UCC section 9-324, if the “holder of a conflicting 
security interest” had filed a financing statement that encompasses 
the “same types of inventory” as the purchase-money security 
interest, the purchase-money security interest holder must comply 
with measures to notify the conflicting security interest holder of her 
interests in the debtor’s property.145 Section 9-324 requires that 
purchase-money security holders send authenticated notification to 
conflicting security holders, that the conflicting security holders 
receive the notice “within five years before the debtor receives 
possession of the inventory,” and that the notification specifies that 
the sender “has or expects to acquire a purchase-money security 
interest in inventory of the debtor and describes the inventory.”146 For 
Susan’s purchase-money security interest to have priority, conflicting 
security holders who had previously filed on their interests in the 
dealer’s inventory must have received Susan’s notification within the 
five-year time frame before the art dealership obtained possession of 
the Picasso.147 
If a court determined that the consignment did not fall under 
section 9-102(a)(20), it may consider whether the consignment falls 
 
 143. U.C.C. § 9-103(d). 
 144. Owens & Hoke, supra note 16, at 24. 
 145. U.C.C. § 9-324. 
 146. Id. § 9-324(b). 
 147. See id. (requiring the receipt of notice by other security interest holders, who had filed 
on their interests, within five years before the purchase-money security interest holder takes 
possession of the security object). 
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under section 2-326.148 But section 2-326 does not provide Susan much 
legal footing in her quest to retrieve her painting. Third-party 
creditors would likely try to claim that Susan’s consignment should be 
deemed a “sale or return” transaction under section 2-326 because a 
“sale or return” transaction is defined as one in which “goods are 
delivered primarily for resale,” and her painting was consigned for 
the sole purpose of being resold.149 Section 2-326 explicitly exposes 
“goods held on sale or return” to creditors’ claims while in the buyer’s 
possession,150 and though the language may seem a bit strained, some 
courts have viewed a consignee as a “buyer for resale.”151 After the 
revision to the UCC in 2001, there is no longer an escape clause for 
goods held by a merchant “generally known to be substantially 
engaged in selling consigned goods.”152 
Susan’s best argument would be that by eradicating all references 
to consignment in section 2-326 when amending the UCC, the 
drafters made a concerted effort to disassociate section 2-326 from 
consignments.153 The court in In re Haley & Steele154 noted that the 
comments to section 2-326 highlight that its “sales provisions” only 
regulate “present sales” and stated that Article 2 requires a transfer 
of title to the buyer for a transaction to constitute a sale under Article 
2.155 Susan could argue that section 2-326 does not apply to her 
painting because although she delivered the painting to the 
dealership, she did not transfer its title to the dealer, therefore, the 
consignment is arguably not a sale under Article 2. 
 
 148. See, e.g., In re Morgansen’s Ltd., 302 B.R. 784, 787 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2003) (describing 
the “standard approach” of beginning by attempting to analyze a consignment transaction under 
9-102(2)(a)(20), and looking to section 2-326 if Article 9 did not provide the appropriate 
framework for the transaction). 
 149. U.C.C. § 2-326(1)(b). 
 150. Id. at § 2-326(2). 
 151. See, e.g., In re Morgansen’s, 302 B.R. at 789 (“If a person takes goods to one who is 
considered a consignee (a ‘buyer’ for resale) and that buyer files for bankruptcy relief, the 
buyer/debtor’s trustee will take the goods as property of the debtor’s estate.”). 
 152. Compare U.C.C. § 2-326 (omitting all of the former section 2-326’s third paragraph 
containing the relevant exception), with U.C.C. § 2-326(3)(b) (2000) (providing that section 2-
326 (that is, the former section 2-326) is not applicable for persons in businesses “generally 
known by his creditors to be substantially engaged in selling goods of others”). 
 153. See Singer & Warren, supra note 14, at 29 (“[A]ll references to consignments were 
deleted from Section 2-326, leaving this provision to govern only ‘sale-or-return’ and ‘sale-on-
approval’ transactions.”). 
 154. In re Haley & Steele, Inc., No. 051617BLS, 2005 WL 3489869 (Mass. Dist. Ct. Nov. 14, 
2005). 
 155. Id. at *4. 
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If a court found that neither Article 9 nor section 2-326 governed 
the Picasso’s consignment, it might revert to the common law of 
bailment.156 The law of bailment would likely aid Susan’s claim to 
rights in her painting by giving her a right to have her painting 
redelivered to her. A bailment relationship arises when the bailor 
agrees to deliver property into the possession of the bailee, under 
terms that the bailee accepts, with an understanding that the property 
will be “redelivered to the person who delivered it, or otherwise dealt 
with according to his directions, or kept until he reclaims it, as the 
case may be.”157 Under the common law of bailment, the bailee has a 
“strict duty to return the bailed goods” when the term of bailment 
ends.158 
Bankruptcy’s treatment of bailment is distinct from its treatment 
of consignment.159 Though the bankruptcy trustee may stay the bailor 
from immediately retrieving bailed property once bankruptcy 
proceedings have begun, the trustee analyzes the rights of the estate 
in artwork pursuant to the bailment agreement.160 The estate may be 
able to claim any rights to funds due to it under the bailment 
agreement, but a court would not consider the painting to be the 
property of the estate.161 The court in In re Guild162 addressed the issue 
of the status of a bailed painting in bankruptcy. The court alluded to 
the dissimilar treatment a painting receives as a bailed good rather 
than a secured good in bankruptcy: “[t]he Summertime painting itself, 
however, was not property of the estate, even under the expansive 
 
 156. See, e.g., In re Morgansen’s, 302 B.R. at 787 (“[I]f the transaction does not fit under 
section 2-236 [sic], then the transaction falls entirely outside the Uniform Commercial Code, 
and the Court must then fall back on the common law of bailments and other traditional 
practices.”). 
 157. 19 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
CONTRACTS § 53:1 (4th ed. 2001) (quoting State v. Warwick, 108 A.2d 85, 89 (Del. Super. Ct. 
1954)). 
 158. Walton Commercial Enters. v. Ass’ns, Conventions, Tradeshows, Inc., 593 N.E.2d 64, 
67 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990). 
 159. See, e.g., Torkelsen v. Maggio (In re Guild & Gallery Plus, Inc.), 72 F.3d 1171, 1179–80 
(3d Cir. 1996) (noting that the bailee’s rights under the bailment agreement would qualify as 
“property of the estate”; however, the bailed painting itself would not become part of the 
bankruptcy estate). 
 160. See id. (noting that in bankruptcy proceedings involving bailed property, “if property 
was in the debtor’s hands as bailee . . . the trustee held it as such, and the bailor . . . could 
recover the property or its proceeds. . . . the estate will include the debtor’s rights under the 
bailment . . . contract” (third omission added) (emphasis omitted) (quoting 4 COLLIER ON 
BANKRUPTCY ¶ 541.08[2], at 42–43 (15th ed. 1995))). 
 161. Id. at 1180. 
 162. Torkelsen v. Maggio (In re Guild & Gallery Plus, Inc.), 72 F.3d 1171 (3d Cir. 1996). 
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definition set forth in section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code. The estate 
had no security interest in the painting. Upon satisfaction of bailment 
agreement, the painting . . . had to be returned.”163 Susan would have 
a strong claim that she was a bailor of the Picasso, that the term of 
bailment had ended, and that the painting should be returned to her. 
Though the system still gives Susan opportunities to reclaim her 
work from the clutches of bankruptcy, her rights to her painting are 
not guaranteed. She must fight her claim in an area of the law where 
“total confusion can reign.”164 Susan must hope for the best-case 
scenario in which a judge can divine the fine distinctions of a 
consignor’s rights in bankruptcy. She will have to devote money and 
time to pursuing her rights to the painting and hope that a judge does 
not succumb to the confusing maze of consignment in bankruptcy and 
rule that the painting is property of the bankruptcy estate. 
IV.  RECONSIDERING THE TREATMENT OF COLLECTOR-
CONSIGNORS IN BANKRUPTCY 
To best promote the arts, state art consignment statutes should 
be amended to protect collector-consignors. In the wake of the 
Salander and Berry-Hill bankruptcies, the specter of bankruptcy 
looms over art galleries.165 With the risk of losing their consigned 
work in bankruptcy proceedings, collectors may become more 
skeptical of selling their artwork through galleries. Major collector 
James McGlothin’s comments about having his artwork mired in the 
Berry-Hill bankruptcy proceedings are telling: “It was frustrating to 
be involved in something where you couldn’t get title to your 
property. This has changed the way we deal with all the galleries. It 
has been a bad thing for everyone.”166 
The treatment of consignment in bankruptcy has often been 
described as mystifying.167 Even following the 2001 UCC revision, 
collectors may be confused about what they must do to perfect a 
 
 163. Id. at 1180 (emphasis added). 
 164. Hillinger, supra note 73, at 74. 
 165. See Mario Naves, The Enron of the Art World?, N.Y. OBSERVER, Oct. 16, 2007, 
http://www.observer.com/2007/enron-art-world (“Anyone believing that Salander-O’Reilly is 
the only gallery built upon a house of cards believes wrong.”). 
 166. Dizard, supra note 4 (quoting collector James McGlothin). 
 167. See Hillinger, supra note 73, at 73 (noting that the treatment of consignment in 
bankruptcy “can baffle persons not fully acquainted with the mysteries of both the Uniform 
Commercial Code . . . and the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 . . . . [and i]t can confuse even 
those who are.” (emphasis omitted)). 
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purchase-money security interest in their consigned artwork. These 
issues, when combined with the art world’s lax treatment of written 
contracts and paperwork attached to artwork, suggest revising the 
treatment of collector-consignors in bankruptcy. First, creating the 
presumption that art dealerships are generally known to be selling the 
goods of others and making proof of the section 9-102(a)(20) 
generally known exception sufficient to exempt consigned artwork 
from bankruptcy would help shape a bankruptcy policy that 
recognizes that the art trade is founded on consignment. Second, 
extending statutory protection already available to artist-collectors to 
consignor-collectors would help return the consignment in 
bankruptcy policy to the purpose originally envisioned by the UCC’s 
drafters. 
A.  Creating a Generally Known Presumption for Art Consignor-
Collectors 
Section 9-102(a)(20)(A)(iii) subtly changes the protections given 
under its precursor, former section 2-326(3).168 The comments to the 
revised section 2-326 note that “[c]ertain true consignments 
transactions were dealt with in former Sections 2-326(3) and 9-114. 
These provisions have been deleted and have been replaced by new 
provisions of Article 9.”169 The language of section 9-102(a)(20) 
closely tracks the language of former section 2-326(3), requiring that 
a consignee must be “not generally known . . . to be substantially 
engaged in selling the goods of others.”170 But under the older 
provision, if the consignor met the generally known exception, the 
consigned property would be excepted from bankruptcy proceedings. 
On the other hand, meeting the generally known exception under 
revised Article 9 “actually dictates under [the provision] that the 
consignee/merchant is not a party to a consignment (as statutorily 
defined),” 171 leaving consigned art vulnerable to the claims of third-
party creditors. 
 
 168. See Savino & Widenor, supra note 96, at 844 (“The second alternative to filing, 
establishing to the trier of fact, under former section 2-326(3)(b), that the bailee was routinely a 
consignee [generally known], was frequently a factual battleground and continues to be under 
the terms of the revised section 9-102(a)(20)(A)(iii).”). 
 169. U.C.C. § 2-326 cmt. 4 (2008). 
 170. Singer & Warren, supra note 14, at 30 (noting that the generally known exception is 
among the language “essentially transported verbatim from former Section 2-326”). 
 171. Savino & Widenor, supra note 96, at 844. 
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A California court noted the common underlying intent of the 
former generally known exception in section 2-326 and its incarnation 
in section 9-102(a)(20), stating, “[t]he purpose of former UCC § 2-
326(3) and now revised UCC §§ 9-102(a)(20) & 9-319(a) is to protect 
general creditors of the consignee from claims of consignors that have 
undisclosed consignment arrangements with the consignee that create 
secret liens on the inventory.”172 The policy reasons for allowing third-
party creditors to attach consigned property when the consignee files 
for bankruptcy are not convincing in an art gallery setting. The major 
policy rationale for allowing third-party creditors to claim consigned 
goods is that unknowing creditors will think the debtor-consignee has 
“ostensible ownership” of consigned goods.173 In the art gallery 
context, this justification is less compelling than in industries in which 
the possibility of consignment may never occur to creditors. 
Adopting an approach in which meeting the section 9-102(a)(20) 
generally known exception would give consignors the right to exempt 
their consigned goods from bankruptcy would help ensure that the 
exception continues to protect unknowing creditors. Otherwise 
creditors who are fully aware of a consignee’s consignment practices 
might be armed with a tool to undermine the consignors’ claims to 
their goods. Without such an approach, the effect of proving the 
generally known exception does not greatly aid the consignor. Even 
after showing that an art dealership was generally known to be selling 
consigned goods, consignors are still forced to wrestle with section 2-
326 to save their consigned artwork from bankruptcy.174 In light of the 
similar goals and language of the former section 2-326(3) and section 
9-102(a)(20) generally known provisions, proving the exception of 
section 9-102(a)(20) should have analogous effect to that of former 
 
 172. In re Valley Media, Inc., 279 B.R. 105, 125 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002). 
 173. See Hillinger, supra note 73, at 79 (highlighting the implication that “the drafters were 
concerned with the problem of the ‘buyer’s’ ostensible ownership of the goods,” and that 
“[c]reditors of a ‘buyer’ in a ‘sale or return’ transaction could easily conclude the ‘buyer,’ in 
possession of the goods, owned the goods”); see also In re Morgansen’s Ltd., No. 04-CV-
0268(ADS), 2005 WL 2370856, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005) (“Regardless of the legal theory 
of the consignment, in practical operation it looks like a sales transaction in which the unpaid 
seller retains a secret lien in his goods. From a creditor’s point of view, the consigned goods 
appear to be part of the regular inventory of the consignee which, therefore, ought to be subject to 
their claims.” (quoting In re Truck Accessories Distrib., Inc., 238 B.R. 444, 448 (Bankr. E.D. 
Ark. 1999))). 
 174. See Savino & Widenor, supra note 96, at 846 (noting that even when a consignment 
transaction falls outside of Article 9’s definition of consignment, “the consignor can still be 
subordinated to its consignee’s creditors if the transaction is a ‘sale or return’ under section 2-
326(1)(b)”). 
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section 2-326(3). This would best protect unknowing creditors 
without burdening consignors in industries in which consignment is a 
given. 
The drafters of the UCC originally created the generally known 
exception to protect “creditors of the buyer [who] may reasonably be 
deemed to have been misled by the secret reservation [of consigned 
goods].”175 Art gallery creditors who know or should know of the art 
gallery’s trade in consigned goods, however, may seek the aid of the 
generally known exception despite the fact that the reservations on 
these goods are likely far from secret.176 In light of the widespread 
practice of consignment in the art world, the presumption should be 
that a gallery is generally known by its creditors to be substantially 
selling in consigned works. Creating the presumption that art 
dealerships are generally known to deal in consigned goods would 
help return to the policy goals originally sought by the drafters. The 
creditors should bear the costs of proving that the gallery was not 
generally known to be substantially selling in consigned goods. 
Because consignment is a common practice in the art world,177 
creditors should assume that some of the gallery’s business involves 
sales of consigned work. With the possibility of consignment in mind, 
creditors should explore the gallery’s sale practices before they 
extend credit to a gallery. If a large percentage of the gallery’s 
inventory is consigned artwork, the creditor should be aware that the 
consigned work is not part of the gallery’s estate. Though rates of 
consignment may vary depending on the dealer’s practices and 
market demands, the fact that a gallery is selling consigned work 
should not come as a sudden shock to creditors when a gallery 
declares bankruptcy. 
In the art world, an industry partially based on consignment, the 
baseline assumption should be that a gallery is substantially selling 
consigned work. If third-party creditors wish to challenge this 
baseline assumption, they should bear the burden of proving that the 
gallery operated in a way that made consigned paintings tantamount 
to hidden liens. If the art gallery obscured its consignment practices 
 
 175. U.C.C. § 2-326 cmt. 2 (2000) (emphasis added). 
 176. Courts have been receptive to modifying the burden of the generally known exception 
of section 2-326 depending on the circumstances of consignment. See Marcone, supra note 47, at 
605 (“Zwagerman is just one example of the courts’ willingness to increase the burden on 
creditors above what is prescribed in the statute, and demonstrates that courts are willing to 
allow at least certain consignors to prevail by means of this exception.”). 
 177. CRAWFORD & MELLON, supra note 24, at 3. 
JAY IN FINAL FINAL.DOC 5/5/2009  4:34:58 PM 
2009] A PICTURE IMPERFECT 1889 
and attempted to conceal the consignment stock in its inventory, 
third-party creditors may make compelling arguments that the 
consignment agreements essentially amounted to “hidden liens” over 
gallery property. These creditors, however, would bear the burden of 
showing that circumstances caused them to be deceived by secret 
consignments. 
Creating a presumption that art dealerships are generally known 
and allowing consignors who prove the exception to exclude the 
consigned artwork from the bankruptcy estate will likely make 
creditors more conscientious about determining the consignment 
practices of galleries before they extend credit. Though some may 
caution that employing this presumption will potentially limit the 
credit available to galleries, the allure of the industry and the 
potential security of paintings that the gallery owns would likely still 
be a draw. Creating the presumption that art dealerships are 
generally known and making proof of the exception sufficient to 
exempt consigned artwork from bankruptcy may make creditors 
more proactive in investigating the financial wellbeing of a gallery on 
the front end.178 
B. Extend Statutory Protection to Collector-Consignors 
State statutes protecting artist-consignors provide a model for 
legislation that might protect consignor-collectors’ rights. The New 
York and California statutes provide examples of statutory language 
that would grant consignors priority rights in their consigned art and 
proceeds.179 Language that clearly established that a consignment 
relationship creates a trust between the collector and the consignor 
and that “no such trust property or trust funds shall be subject or 
subordinate to any claims, liens or security interest of any kind or 
nature whatsoever” would be helpful.180 Such language would provide 
 
 178. See, e.g., James Panero, An Old Master in Ruins, N.Y. MAG., Mar. 24, 2008, 
http://nymag.com/news/features/45324 (describing how Salander-O’Reilly obtained new 
financing from creditors after an initial bout of financial problems). Perhaps if creditors bore the 
burden of proving that the gallery was not “generally known,” these creditors might have 
inquired more into Salander’s sales practices and financial accountings. 
 179. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1738.6 (West 1998) (featuring provisions that create trusts for 
the consigned work of artists, insulating the work from claiming creditors in bankruptcy); N.Y. 
ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 12.01 (McKinney Supp. 2008) (containing similar provisions). 
 180. N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 12.01. 
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clarity in an area marked by confusion.181 If collectors could point to a 
collector-consignment statute, they might be able keep their artwork 
and proceeds outside of the bankruptcy milieu. Such language would 
also give a collector-consignor an automatic claim to consigned 
artwork and its proceeds. Collector-consignors would no longer be 
required to show that they are secured creditors who have met UCC 
filing requirements. 
Opponents of extending statutory protection to collector-
consignors might argue that such a statute is unnecessary. They might 
contend that a responsible collector could gain adequate protection 
by simply filing a UCC-1 financing statement.182 Collectors likely 
appear much less sympathetic and defenseless to the rules of UCC 
filing than starving artists. Opponents may further argue that 
collectors often have access to resources and counsel to help them 
make UCC filings. These arguments, though pragmatic, ignore the 
realities of the art business. 
The art market operates under fluid principles of accounting and 
recording. Gentleman’s agreements and handshake deals are the 
rules of the art trade.183 Some dealers view being asked to sign UCC 
financing statements as “almost an insult.”184 Art dealers view the 
paperwork attached to UCC-1 filings as bothersome.185 Requiring 
UCC-1 forms in a world in which written contracts are often not 
drafted creates a rule that is out of touch with the realities of the art 
market. In 1992, an Article 9 study group composed of a number of 
commercial law experts argued in favor of eliminating the filing 
 
 181. See Hillinger, supra note 73, at 74 (“When the consignment transaction enters the 
magical kingdom of bankruptcy, total confusion can reign.”). 
 182. See Dizard, supra note 4 (quoting a Berry-Hill creditor on the lack of due diligence in 
UCC filings and arguing that “[a]n eight-year-old can turn on an online database which gives 
liens on owners as well as on individual objects”). 
 183. See Haden-Guest, supra note 32 (discussing the “culture of handshakes and secrecy” in 
the art world). 
 184. Suzanna Andrews, The Art of the Steal, CONDÉ NAST PORTFOLIO, Apr. 2008, at 124, 
144, available at http://www.portfolio.com/culture-lifestyle/culture-inc/arts/2008/03/17/Art-
Dealer-Larry-Salander-Trials (quoting art dealer Richard Feigen); see also Haden-Guest, supra 
note 32 (“Anyone tries to take precautions in this business, it’s offensive to someone. Someone 
not too long ago wanted us to show a painting to a client of ours. And they wanted us to sign a 
UCC filing. As if we were a debtor!” (quoting Richard Feigen)). 
 185. See CRAWFORD & MELLON, supra note 24, at 29 (noting that in artist-dealer 
transactions, dealers are usually reluctant to spend the time “go[ing] through the paperwork 
necessary to place the lien on the artwork and later remove it at the time of sale”). Crawford 
and Mellon note, however, that there is an exception to this general reluctance toward UCC 
paperwork when an art piece is highly valued. Id. 
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requirement for “transactions for which requiring the filing of a 
financing statement (on pain of subordination) would be 
inappropriate (e.g., the delivery for sale of consumer goods by a 
natural person or art by artists).”186 They noted that it was 
unreasonable to require “most natural persons” who deliver their 
work to a consignee to precisely follow UCC filing requirements.187 
The study group also argued that the policy goals underlying the filing 
requirement are unlikely to be implicated in consumer consignment 
transaction. The likelihood that consumers who were delivering 
goods to a merchant were in fact crafting “a subterfuge for inventory 
financing” was low.188 The committee noted that other transactions 
might also be exempted from the UCC filing requirement, specifically 
citing “delivery for sale of art by an artist to an art dealer.”189 
In a footnote, the study group noted that the filing requirement 
might not be unreasonably onerous for some knowledgeable 
consumers, giving as an example “a sophisticated art collector who 
consigns art to a gallery.”190 The study group’s suggestion might have 
been founded on a misconception that the art market is 
interchangeable with other financial markets and that one’s behavior 
in financial dealings automatically translates to one’s behavior in art 
dealings. Although commercially sophisticated actors are prominent 
players in the art world, they often conduct their business in the art 
world from an entirely different perspective.191 An in-house counsel at 
an auction house noted that the art world often elicits different 
behavior from commercial actors: “Business people who would never 
think of buying a house without a contract will spend the same money 
on a painting without checking on who actually owns it or who lent 
money against it.”192 Collectors in this sense are often acting in a 
personal capacity and are much more similar to the consumers the 
 
 186. PERMANENT EDITORIAL BD. FOR THE UNIF. COMMERCIAL CODE, REPORT OF THE 
ARTICLE 9 STUDY COMMITTEE 187 (1992). 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. at 188 n.7. 
 191. See supra note 5. 
 192. John Dizard, The Murky World of Art Finance, FT.COM, Apr. 12, 2008, 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6bc14b76-0820-11dd-a922-0000779fd2ac.html (quoting an in-house 
lawyer at an auction house). 
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Article 9 study group wanted to protect.193 Dispensing with the filing 
requirement and extending statutory protection to collectors would 
be consistent with the intent of the drafters. 
CONCLUSION 
As the Berry-Hill and Salander consignor-collectors can attest, 
using the same bankruptcy standards to evaluate the consignment of 
screwdrivers and the consignment of artwork is misguided.194 
Allowing third-party creditors to attach consigned goods in 
bankruptcy was originally intended to protect creditors from being 
duped into lending money on the promise of collateral that was 
secretly tied up by other commitments.195 The art trade is founded on 
consignment. The fact that many dealerships consign artwork is 
hardly secret, so the concern that drove the policy of allowing third-
party creditors to attach consigned property seems misplaced in the 
art gallery context. 
The UCC filing system and its requirements were an attempt to 
provide consignors a means to alert creditors of their rights in 
collateral. In a hardware store context, the UCC filing represents a 
reasonable means to flag inventory that may be on consignment. The 
customs of the art world, however, do not mesh as well with the 
concrete paperwork and filing requirements of the UCC. 
In recognizing that artwork stands apart from the consignment of 
other goods, bankruptcy courts should not mechanically apply the 
general consignment rule to consigned artwork. States have already 
responded to the unique demands of consigned art in statutes that 
create trusts for artwork consigned by artists to dealerships. Another 
possible response would be creating a presumption that art galleries 
are generally known to sell consigned goods and modifying the effect 
of proving the generally known exception so that it allows consignors 
to block creditors from seizing their work in bankruptcy. With art 
consignment being a customary practice in the art industry, the 
 
 193. See PERMANENT EDITORIAL BD. FOR THE UNIF. COMMERCIAL CODE, supra note 186, 
at 187 (recommending changes to protect consignors from the unreasonable burdens of UCC 
filing). 
 194. See A Dealer and Collector Describes His Experiences with Berry-Hill, supra note 30 
(“[U]nfortunately, the law treats the consignment of art to the gallery the same way they would 
treat the consignment of screwdrivers to a shop.” (quoting the Hon. Joseph P. Carroll)). 
 195. U.C.C. § 2-326 cmt. 2 (2000) (limiting application of the section to “cases in which 
creditors . . . may reasonably be deemed to have been misled by the secret reservation”). 
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expectation should be that some of the work in an art gallery is 
consigned. Third-party creditors, not art consignors, should bear the 
burden of showing that a gallery’s consignment practice was not 
generally known by creditors. Moreover, proving the exception 
should be sufficient for the consignors to keep their artwork out of 
bankruptcy proceedings; they should not be forced to continue 
fighting for their paintings under section 2-326 and common law 
bailment principles. Adopting such changes would help ensure that 
the law appreciates both the tangible and intangible value of artwork 
and that consigned artwork is not merely treated as another piece of 
hardware.196 
 
 196. See A Dealer and Collector Describes His Experiences with Berry-Hill, supra note 30 
(discussing the law’s similar treatment of consigned screwdrivers and consigned artwork in 
bankruptcy). 
